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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  sociological  and  biological  factors  which  gave  rise  to the  three  pandemic  waves  of  Spanish  influenza
in  England  during  1918–19  are  still  poorly  understood.  Symptom  reporting  data  available  for  a limited
set  of locations  in England  indicates  that  reinfection  in  multiple  waves  occurred,  suggesting  a  role  for
loss  of infection-acquired  immunity.  Here  we explore  the  role that  changes  in  host  immunity,  driven  by
a  combination  of  within-host  factors  and  viral  evolution,  may  play  in  explaining  weekly mortality  data
and  wave-by-wave  symptomatic  attack-rates  available  for a subset  of English  cities.  Our  results  indicate
that  changes  in  the  phenotype  of the pandemic  virus  are  likely  required  to explain  the  closely  spaced
waves  of infection,  but distinguishing  between  the  detailed  contributions  of  viral  evolution  and  changing
adaptive  immune  responses  to  transmission  rates  is difficult  given  the  dearth  of sero-epidemiological
and virological  data  available  even  for more  contemporary  pandemics.  We  find  that a dynamical  model
in which  pre-pandemic  protection  in  older  “influenza-experienced”  cohorts  is  lost  rapidly  prior  to  the
second  wave  provides  the best  fit to the  mortality  and  symptom  reporting  data.  Best fitting  parameter
estimates  for  such  a model  indicate  that  post-infection  protection  lasted  of  order  months,  while  other
statistical  analyses  indicate  that population-age  was  inversely  correlated  with  overall  mortality  during
the  herald  wave.  Our  results  suggest  that  severe  secondary  waves  of pandemic  influenza  may  be triggered
by viral  escape  from  pre-pandemic  immunity,  and  thus  that  understanding  the  role  of heterosubtypic
or  cross-protective  immune  responses  to  pandemic  influenza  may  be key  to controlling  the  severity of
future  influenza  pandemics.
d  by © 2014  Publishe
ntroduction
The “Spanish” influenza pandemic of 1918–19 was  responsi-
le for tens of millions of deaths worldwide. Despite pre-dating
he isolation of the influenza virus, epidemiological records from
he 1918 influenza pandemic have allowed much to be inferred
bout the transmission characteristics of the 1918 pandemic virus
henceforth pH1N11918) (e.g. Fraser et al., 2011; Valleron et al.,
010). However the ecological conditions which gave rise to the
hree distinct peaks of mortality over a period of just nine months
n England and Wales (Smallman-Raynor et al., 2002; Pearce et al.,
011) remain intriguing.
∗ Corresponding author at: School of Mathematical Sciences and School of Com-
unity Health Sciences, University of Nottingham, University Park, NG7 2RD, United
ingdom. Tel.: +44 7774582526.
E-mail addresses: kirsty.bolton@nottingham.ac.uk (K.J. Bolton),
amesm@unimelb.edu.au (J.M. McCaw).
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755-4365/© 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BElsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Virological and genealogical studies of the 1918 pandemic virus,
whilst based on limited genetic samples, imply that pH1N11918
had been circulating in mammals for several years prior to the
pandemic, and likely co-circulated with seasonal and swine lin-
eages of H1N1 (Smith et al., 2009; dos Reis et al., 2011). In more
contemporary pandemics severe second waves of pandemic trans-
mission may  have been triggered by changes in the circulating
virus (Viboud et al., 2005). Heterosubtypic immunity mediated by
cellular responses or cross-reactive antibody is relevant even for
novel pandemic influenza viruses (Grebe et al., 2008), and proba-
bly influenced cohort disease severity in more recent pandemics
(Slepushkin, 1959; Epstein, 2006). Multi-wave epidemics such as
that observed in England in 1918–19 offer rare opportunities to
infer the nature of short-term shifts in adaptive protection and/or
viral evolution.Circulation of multiple viral phenotypes, loss of adaptive
immunity, and variable transmissibility have been considered as
mechanisms in models for pandemic influenza transmission and
mortality in 1918–19 (Shi et al., 2010; He et al., 2011; Mathews
Y-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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Table  1
Patterns of symptom reporting per thousand head of population for 5 cities. Entries under each heading Nijk , i, j, k ∈ {0, 1} correspond to the number of people (per unit
thousand) who  reported illness in waves 1, 2 and/or 3 if i, j and/or k = 1, respectively. The second to last column shows the total surveyed population (Nsurvey) and the final
column  the total population size (N). The final row shows the symptom reporting pattern for the composite data set.
City N111 N101 N011 N001 N110 N100 N010 Nsurvey Ntotal
Blackburn 0.778 4.67 7.78 64.6 5.45 75.5 56.1 1284 113 000
Leicester 0.432 4.76 8.01 69.9 3.03 62.1 135 4619 213 000
Manchester 0.640 5.54 2.34 15.6 14.3 131 83.6 4686 659 000
Newcastle 0.448 8.74 3.81 73.0 0.448 52.4 46.6 4461 267 000
0 40.9 73.4 1075 83 000
5.58 79.0 85.3 16 125 1 335 000
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Table 2
Summary of prior and acquired immunity characteristics of candidate models.
Acquired Prior
None Sustained Temporary
Constant Variable
We trial eight candidate models, grouped into families A–D, as
summarised in Table 2. All candidates are simple modificationsWigan 0.930 0 1.86 108 
Composite 0.558 5.76 4.77 57.1
t al., 2007, 2010). In some regions changes in population mixing
ue to mandatory or reactive social distancing may  be suffi-
ient to explain second peaks of disease (Bootsma and Ferguson,
007; Caley et al., 2008). It is not clear that social distancing was
idespread in the UK in 1918–19 (Ministry of Health, 1920), how-
ver recently He et al. employed a stochastic transmission model
o demonstrate that reactive social distancing, supplemented by
easonal and school-term effects, was a plausible mechanism for
enerating the variation in transmission rates required to repro-
uce the pattern of mortality in England and Wales (He et al.,
013). Dynamical models in which transmissibility is modulated
nly by social mixing effects cannot explain records of multiple
ymptomatic infections over the course of the 1918–19 pandemic
Ministry of Health, 1920). In previous work, motivated by epi-
emiological evidence indicating recent exposure to influenza can
rovide some lasting heterologous protection against symptomatic
isease (Slepushkin, 1959; Barry et al., 2008), viral shedding
McMichael et al., 1983) and/or laboratory confirmed influenza
Wilkinson et al., 2012; Epstein, 2006), we have shown that loss
f pre-pandemic and acquired adaptive protection likely played
 significant role in the transmission dynamics of the 1918 pan-
emic (Mathews et al., 2007, 2010). In this paper we  present a set
f dynamical models for pandemic influenza transmission with var-
ous immunologically motivated prescriptions for the behaviour of
re-pandemic and adaptive immunity that do not a priori assume
he emergence of new viral phenotypes over the course of the pan-
emic. We  compare the ability of candidate models to fit composite
ortality and symptom reporting data from 1918 to 1919 for a set
f English cities. We  discuss the plausibility and interpretation of
hese models and the consequences of our findings for predicting
he severity of future pandemic outbreaks.
ethods
ata and historical context
The influenza pandemic of 1918–19 killed approximately 2 per
ent of the population in the United Kingdom with excess mortality
n England estimated to be ∼0.3% (Murray et al., 2006). The her-
ld summer wave was characterised by very high morbidity and a
arked shift towards mortality in younger age groups (e.g. Nguyen-
an-Tam and Hampson, 2003). The following autumn wave was the
ost severe; with the highest death rates and case fatality ratios.
ecords of the succeeding winter wave characteristically note a
ecrease in death count relative to the autumn wave (see Chowell
t al., 2008, and references therein).
There is inconclusive evidence of changes in the virus during
918–19. Genetic analyses of the partial viral isolates recovered
uggest that at least two lineages of H1N1 were in circulation (Reid
t al., 2003, 2004; Taubenberger and Morens, 2006; Morens and
auci, 2007). Clinical notes indicate changes in disease severity over
he course of the pandemic: an incongruence between the mild
ymptoms of the summer wave and the severe autumn wave wasConstant A1 B1 C1 D1
Boosted A2 B2 C2 D2
mentioned, and doctors speculated that the pathogen circulating in
the winter may  have been different again (Ministry of Health, 1920,
p. 144). Mean hospitalisation rates in US army training camps were
also lower in the first than subsequent wave (Barry et al., 2008).
The Medical Officer for Health in Manchester describes rec-
ommendations that citizens were advised to avoid large social
gatherings and attend to personal hygiene in order to minimise
their risk of contracting influenza (Ministry of Health, 1920, p.
471). There are also reports of school closures in Manchester dur-
ing the summer wave. However, cinemas, churches and theatres
were reported to have operated largely unhindered with small
changes in regulations such as improved ventilation, cancelled Sun-
day school classes, and the prohibition of pre-teenage children into
cinemas/theatres. We are unaware of the degree of recommended
and reactive social distancing in the other cities under study here
and do not take into account any social distancing effects in our
model.
We have aggregated weekly mortality data for the period 29th
June 1918–10th May  1919 and wave-by-wave symptom reporting
data for five English cities (Blackburn, Leicester, Manchester, New-
castle and Wigan) as reported by the Ministry of Health (Ministry
of Health, 1920) into a “composite” data set representative of the
epidemic in mid-north England. Note that we  do not assume
that the composite data set is generated by homogeneous mix-
ing between the 5 cities from which the data was collected. Error
bars for composite data points are calculated using bootstrapping
methods (Efron, 1979). Our aggregation will average over spatial
heterogeneities, which reflect the spatial diffusion of the pathogen
(Smallman-Raynor et al., 2002; Eggo et al., 2010). However the
cities that have symptom reporting data available are all located in
mid-north England and have epidemics of similar timing.1 Symp-
tom reporting data is reproduced in Table 1, and the composite
mortality data is shown in Fig. 2. We  append 15 null weekly death
counts to the mortality data in order to penalise models that predict
unobserved waves of infection when performing model fitting.
Model structure1 The autumn wave in the most southerly city Leicester is slightly delayed com-
pared to the other cities.
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Fig. 1. Basic compartmental model configuration for models with (a) absent or sustained partial prior immunity or (b) waning/temporary sterilising prior immunity. In
(a)  the subscripts ‘E’ and ‘N’ refer to influenza-experienced and naïve hosts respectively, with the former exhibiting lower susceptibility, infectiousness and propensity to
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teport  symptoms. In (b) the compartment Q represents hosts who  are initially pr
ther  compartments are described by an Erlang-2 distribution with rate parameter
roportion xI of hosts with sustained sterilising pre-pandemic immunity, captured 
f an S (Susceptible)–E (Exposed)–I  (Infectious)–A (Asymptomati-
ally infectious)–R (Recovered) model for pandemic influenza virus
ransmission, as shown in Fig. 1 and in greater detail in Supple-
entary Material Figures S1–S4. Common to all models is the
ssumption that the basic reproduction number changes only due
o a seasonal forcing term, but the symptomatic reporting pro-
ortions ˛i and case fatality rates i are independent for each
ave (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}). Asymptomatic infections may  correspond to
ub-clinical infections or unreported disease. Deterministic epi-
emic dynamics become unrealistic when the number of infections
ecomes very small, as may  occur during inter-wave periods. To
nsure each wave is initiated at an appropriate time we seed the
opulation with a single infected host before each wave i at a fitted
ime Tseed,i. We assume that seasonal forcing is sinusoidal and fit
oth the phase SF and amplitude bSF of the modulating function.
ll models assume that a proportion (of the population) governed
y parameter xI have lasting sterilising protection (compartment P)
otivated by observations that antigenic recycling (Ahmed et al.,
007) can give rise to antibody mediated protection in older hosts
Itoh et al., 2009). These hosts may  alternatively represent socially
solated groups/individuals.
Our models must include the possibility that infection-acquired
rotection against the pandemic virus is lost in order to explain
he reports of repeated symptoms across multiple waves. Acquired
mmunity wanes at a rate w for all candidate models. In model
amilies A–D we trial one model (A1, B1, C1 & D1) in which the
ate of loss of acquired protection is constant (w ∝ 1/Tw). For all
ther candidate models (A2, B2, C2 & D2) we assume that acquired
mmunity is lost at a rate that declines geometrically with each
nfection n [w ∝ 1/(Twn−1Tw )]. The parameter Tw therefore indi-
ates the expected duration of protection following first infection
or all model candidates. Boosting of the duration of protection by
 factor Tw following repeated infections may  signal the consol-
dation of adaptive immune responses against a novel pandemic
irus (as sometimes noted following repeated doses of vaccine (Zhu
t al., 2009)). Alternatively, increased duration of host protection
ith each infection may  reflect the circulation of a limited number
f phenotypically distinct viruses.
Our simplest family of models, A, are captured by the lower
EIAR loop in Fig. 1a, and assume that the only form of pre-pandemic
mmunity is sustained sterilising immunity for a proportion xI
f hosts (compartment P). For models in family B, we allow for
he existence of widespread partial sustained prior immunity byd. Susceptible hosts become exposed at a rate  ˇ ∝ Reff(t). Waiting times between
Q → S), w (R → S), 1/Te (E → I) or 1/Ti (I → R). All candidate models also allow for a
 isolated compartment P as described in the main text.
stratifying the population into influenza-experienced hosts SE and
influenza-naïve hosts SN (see Fig. 1a). This pre-pandemic immu-
nity is attributed to hosts beginning in the modified susceptibility
state SE, with abundance determined by the parameter xE, who
experience reduced susceptibility, reduced propensity to report
symptoms, and reduced propensity to transmit infection by fac-
tors S, ˛ and I, respectively. Such pre-pandemic protection may
be afforded by cross-protective cellular and/or humoral immune
responses remnant from prior exposure to seasonal IAV variants
(e.g. Brown and Kelso, 2009; Krause et al., 2011). In model fam-
ily B, recovered naïve hosts migrate into the experienced stratum
(RN → SE) as the epidemic progresses.
There is no sustained partial prior immunity for models in fam-
ilies C & D. Instead waning sterilising pre-pandemic immunity is
attributed to a portion of the population governed by (1 − z)(1 − xI)
who begin in the compartment Q. In family C this prior immu-
nity is lost at a constant rate (wQ ∝ 1/TwQ). In family D prior
immunity is lost at a variable rate depending on the state of the epi-
demic (wQ ∝ 1/TwQ + kwanQIcum(S + R)/(S + 1)) following the initial
seed infection. The latter form, where Icum is the cumulative num-
ber of symptomatic and asymptomatic infectious over the epidemic
wave and kwanQ is a fitted parameter, may  mimic  the introduc-
tion of a novel IAV variant or viral escape of prior immunity due to
the accrual of genetic diversity [∝Icum] and increase in immunity-
driven selective pressure [∝(S + R)/(S + 1)] over the course of the first
epidemic wave (Boni et al., 2006).
The effective reproduction number Reff depends on the current
susceptibility profile of the population and seasonal timing:
Reff(t) = R0
S(t)
N(xEIS + (1 − xE))
1
bSF cos(2(t + SF))
,  (1)
where N is the population size and t is the time in weeks since the
simulation begins (chosen to be 27th May  1918, just over a month
prior to the first mortality data point). S(t) = SE(t)IS + SN(t) for
model families A & B or S(t) = S(t) for model families C & D. Full
model details, including differential equations and initial condi-
tions, are provided in the Supplementary Material.
Model fitting and interpretationWe  fit each candidate model to the composite data set
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques with
simulated annealing (Earl and Deem, 2005). We  maximise a
pidem
p
t
d
m
o
d
p
o
i
m
o
o
i
o
g
a
C
u
r
t
e
c
t
p
s
c
R
t
m
a
t
e
t
b
(
m
t
(
m
p
P
f
b
t
m
o
i
e
p
C
s
m
t
t
p
p
rK.J. Bolton et al. / E
seudo-likelihood calculated by comparing model output to mor-
ality and case reporting data assuming that all counts are Poisson
istributed (see Mathews et al., 2007, and Section S2, Supple-
entary Material). Parameters are assigned either uniform priors
r biologically/epidemiologically motivated informative priors, as
etailed in full in the Supplementary Material. Briefly, informative
riors give preference to values of Ti which result in a serial interval
f 2 days, values of Tw large enough that reinfection within a wave
s rare, and large (small) values z (xI) to preference fits with low to
oderately extensive pre-pandemic immunity. We also place pri-
rs on Tseed,i which peak approximately 2 weeks before the onset
f each mortality wave and preference values for the case fatal-
ty rate which are in agreement with the survey data and values
f SF which maximise virus transmissibility in winter. Conver-
ence is assessed by rerunning the MCMC  algorithm with randomly
ssigned initial parameters (Section S3, Supplementary Material).
We estimate the sample size corrected Akaike Information
riteria (AICc) (Akaike, 1974) to compare candidate models. Given
ncertainties in viral circulation and adaptive and innate immune
esponses to the pandemic virus(es), each candidate model is
heoretically immunologically defensible. However, parameter
stimates across model candidates may  show varying biologi-
al/epidemiological consistency. Models are ruled implausible if
hey cannot reproduce most trends in the observed data or if the
arameter estimates yield biologically/epidemiologically implau-
ible interpretations. In addition, we assess the ability of plausible
andidate models to fit individual city data.
esults
Best fitting model dynamics are shown in Fig. 2 and Supplemen-
ary Material Figures S5 & S6. Parameter estimates for all candidate
odels are shown in Fig. 3 and Supplementary Material Figure S7
nd Table S2. Models A1 and B1 – which do not permit boosting of
he duration of acquired immunity or waning of prior protection –
ach predict repeated (unobserved waves of post-pandemic infec-
ion (see Figure S5, Supplementary Material). Even if we permit the
asic reproduction number to differ between waves in model A1
denoting this modification model A1*), we cannot reproduce the
ortality data well, and the poor fit requires the transmissibility
o increase drastically and arguably unrealistically between waves
see Figures S5 & S9, Supplementary Material). We  thus exclude
odels A1 and B1 from further discussion and discuss the inter-
retation and plausibility of all other candidate models below.
re-pandemic protection
The inferred proportion of sterilising pre-pandemic protection
or model families C & D [given by xE(xI + (1 − z)(1 − xI))] varies
etween candidate models. All but D2 of the candidate models in
hese families prefer 88% of hosts to have pre-pandemic (per-
anent or temporary) sterilising protection despite strong priors
n z and xI biasing against such levels. Such widespread sterilis-
ng immunity is likely unrealistic given estimates of the fraction of
lderly who were protected against new viruses in contemporary
andemics (Itoh et al., 2009), and therefore our fits for models C1,
2 & D1 are arguably also implausible. Temporary pre-pandemic
terilising protection is lost rapidly during the first wave for all but
odel C1 for these families (for which it is lost more gradually over
he three waves).
Having excluded models C1, C2 & D1, only D2 remains a poten-ially plausible candidate of the models with temporary prior
rotection. Lower values of pre-pandemic protection of around 40
er cent are inferred for this model, three quarters of which is lost
apidly during the first wave. Such prevalence may  be plausibleics 8 (2014) 18–27 21
if widespread recent IAV infection offered temporary protection
against infection with the newly emerged pandemic virus, or alter-
natively, exposure to IAVs over previous seasons protected older
hosts (Epstein, 2006) but the virus was able to escape this protec-
tion during the first wave. Furthermore, with only 1 in 10 exposures
being recorded in morbidity data (˛1 ≈ 0.1), those who did lose their
protection rapidly and were exposed were highly likely to have a
mild (and so unobserved) illness.
Loss of pre-pandemic protection is not required to generate a
triple-peaked epidemic; one of our simplest models (A2) with only
permanent sterilising pre-pandemic protection (due to hosts in P)
can roughly fit the case reporting and mortality data (albeit with a
poor match to the shape of the first wave, Fig. 2) with around 12 per
cent isolated/protected. Including the possibility of partial and sus-
tained pre-pandemic protection (model B2) changes the inferred
initial susceptibility profile very little (although acquisition of par-
tial protection – by moving from RN to SE in Fig. 1 – following the
first infection broadens the first epidemic peak improving the fit to
the mortality data).
Transmission parameters
The inferred basic reproduction number varies with candidate
model structure. Maximum likelihood values range from ∼3.6–10,
but are below ∼5.5 for all models except C1 & D1 (which we
have ruled implausible) and model B2. The posterior distribution
of R0 in model B2 appears bimodal (see Supplementary Material).
Whilst the maximum likelihood value is in the higher mode centred
around ∼10, the lower mode is centred around R0 ∼ 5 indicating
moderate values of R0 are not incompatible with this model struc-
ture.
The estimated value of R0 for model D2 is slightly lower than
that for our simplest model (A). Whilst for a single epidemic wave
estimates of R0 typically increase with the amount of prior immu-
nity (e.g. Mills et al., 2004), our results highlight that inclusion of
pre-pandemic immunity does not necessarily inflate estimates of
R0 for multi-wave pandemics. The model effective reproduction
number is very high at the beginning of the simulation for all best-
fitting candidates but peaks at 1.2–1.5 for the second and third
pandemic waves, consistent with empirical measurements of the
growth rate of pH1N11918 in US communities (White and Pagano,
2008).
Despite strong priors biasing the pseudo-likelihood toward
infectious periods of 1.6 days, estimates of Ti range from less than
half a day to almost 3 days across candidate models. Models C1 &
D1 (which have very similar fitted parameter sets) prefer a very
low value for Ti consistent with the very high force of infection
required to sustain transmission in a population that is slower to
lose both prior and acquired protection. Across other candidate
models estimates of the serial interval are 3–4.5 days, in keeping
with estimates for the Spanish influenza pandemic using mortality
data from London (He et al., 2011) and RAF camps (Mathews et al.,
2007).
Seasonality of transmission plays a strong role in all plausible
model fits, with phase (SF) and amplitude (bSF) indicating trans-
mission in the winter months is enhanced by 50–100 per cent
compared to summer/autumn. The failure of model B1 to fit a triple
peaked epidemic indicates that sinusoidal seasonal forcing alone
cannot halt a fourth wave of infection in a simple SEIAR transmis-
sion model.
Disease severityOur model fits suggest that asymptomatic infections were
common, especially in the first wave, with all plausible models
preferring ˛1 0.1 (i.e. at most 1 in 10 infections was  reported
22 K.J. Bolton et al. / Epidemics 8 (2014) 18–27
Fig. 2. Model fits to composite data. Top: Model fit (solid black line) with Poisson error (grey shaded region) to the weekly mortality data (dots). Upper middle:  Model fit and
Poisson  error (white with error bars) for the symptom reporting data with bootstrapped errors (solid black with error bars). The x-axis labels ijk,  with i, j, k ∈ {0, 1} indicate
reported illness in waves 1, 2 and/or 3 if i, j and/or k = 1, respectively. Lower middle: Fraction of population with temporary acquired protection (blue), waning prior protection
(red)  and permanent sterilising protection (black). Bottom: Effective reproduction number as a function of time (black) compared to the threshold value (grey). The seasonal
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he  reader is referred to the web  version of this article.)
uring the herald wave). Higher values for ˛i are preferred for
ater waves indicating relatively more symptomatic infections, but
symptomatic infections (occurring in a proportion 1 − ˛˛i) are
till far more common than symptomatic infections in waves 2
nd 3 for plausible models. Estimated case fatality rates rates (i)
re consistent across all models as they are highly constrained by
he ratio of reported symptomatic infections and deaths within
ach wave. Inferred case fatality rates are highest in the second
ave (see Figure S7, Supplementary Material). The overall attackate including asymptomatic (or unreported) infections is in excess
f 80 per cent for the models ruled plausible, and highest for
odels in families A or B. As immunity is on average longer-
asting amongst hosts following the third wave of infection, furtherdels A2 and B2. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend,
epidemics are prevented for 1–2 years for all best fitting models bar
A1 and B1.
Acquired protection and virus circulation
Waning of acquired protection is necessary to fit the three waves
of mortality and the observations of repeated symptomatic infec-
tion amongst some hosts across all model candidates. However only
models that include boosting (Tw > 1) – ensuring that acquired
protection is eventually sustained following repeated infection –
yield plausible model fits (models A2, B2, C2). Including boosting
also often significantly improves the fit to the symptom repor-
ting data within a given model family (see Table 3). Of the three
K.J. Bolton et al. / Epidemics 8 (2014) 18–27 23
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cig. 3. Maximum likelihood values (stars), 95 per cent credibility regions (straddled
rosses  indicate the value of fixed parameter values.
lausible models (A2,B2,D2), model D2 is preferred based on AICc
lone followed by model B2. The key differences in the interpreta-
ion of these models is the acquisition and loss of immunity to the
andemic virus (Table 4).
Estimated boosting factors Tw are higher for models in families
 & D, and together with longer durations of protection following
nitial infection Tw , would permit up to 2 infections to occur over
he course of the 9 month pandemic. Evidence that children may
equire two vaccine doses to generate an immunogenic response to
 novel virus (Zhu et al., 2009) could support such a boosting model.
or the single plausible model within these families (model D2),
rotection following initial protection is inferred to be ∼3 months.
his estimate for Tw is consistent with other analyses of similar
ata sets suggesting that there is some loss of protection between
able 3
omparison of model performance; the number of fitted model parameters (Nparam), max
ue  to the mortality and symptom reporting data, respectively), sample-size corrected 
andidate trialled.
Model Nparams Maximum log-pseudo-likelihood 
A1 15 −2084 (−2032, −52) 
A2  16 −772 (−665, −107) 
B1  19 −1505 (−1234, −271) 
B2  20 −739 (−638, −101) 
C1  17 −892 (−598, −294) 
C2  18 −652 (−583, −69) 
D1  18 −837 (−572, −264) 
D2  19 −630 (−532, −98) ts) and median values (open circles) for model parameters across candidate models.
successive pandemic waves (Mathews et al., 2007; Slepushkin,
1959; Barry et al., 2008).
In contrast, loss of protection following initial infection for mod-
els A2 & B2 without prior immunity is particularly short (∼10.5
days), and as many as 3 infections are required for sustained pro-
tection. Model based inferences from other influenza epidemics
indicate that reinfection over a period of days or weeks can occur
(Mathews et al., 2007), consistent with observations that very
recent infection does not provide protection against lethal chal-
lenge in chickens (Seo and Webster, 2001). However, there is little
immunological evidence to suggest that three exposures would
be required to generate sustained protection to the same virus,
suggesting interpretation of models A2 and B2 requires the cir-
culation of multiple phenotypically distinct lineages. Infections in
imum values for the log-pseudo-likelihood (and the break-down into components
Akaike Information Criteria (AICc), and plausibility of the best fit model for each
AICc Plausibility
4218 × 4th wave
1587
√
3062 × 4th wave
1534
√
1829 ×high pre-pandemic immunity (∼88%)
1354 ×high pre-pandemic immunity (∼96%)
1724 ×high pre-pandemic immunity (∼88%)
1313
√
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Table 4
Model parameter descriptions. Full definitions are given in Table S1, Supplementary
Material.
Parameter Description
R0 Basic reproduction number
˛i (Unscaled) symptomatic proportion in ith wave
xE Fraction with partial sustained prior immunity
xI Fraction with lasting prior sterilising protection
z  Fraction of population beginning in S rather than Q
Ti Infectious period in days
Te Latent period following exposure
bSF Amplitude of seasonal forcing term
SF Phase of seasonal forcing term
Tseed,i Seeding time for ith wave in days after 27th May 1918
Tw Timescale of acquired sterilising protection
TwQ Timescale of prior sterilising protection
i Case fatality rate in the ith wave
˛ Scale factor for symptomatic proportion in experienced strata
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sS Scale factor for susceptibility in experienced strata
I Scale factor for infectiousness in experienced strata
kwanQ Scaling for acceleration of loss of prior protection
odel B2 still induce lasting protection against disease; param-
ter estimates are consistent with a reduction in the probability
f symptomatic infection upon reinfection of 70% (˛ ∼ 0.3). The
aximum-likelihood fit for model B2 also prefers I< 1, indicating
 reduction in viral shedding for those in the experienced class (see
ig. 1). However the infectiousness of experienced hosts is indis-
inguishable from that of naïve hosts (I ∼ 1) for values of R0 in the
ower mode for this model. Estimating population-level transmis-
ibility from epidemiological data for such a model will be aided
y results of controlled experiments to isolate the determinants of
irus transmissibility.
its to individual city data
All three models ruled plausible based on their ability to fit the
omposite data set (A2, B2, D2) yield reasonable fits to the mortality
nd symptom reporting data for the original locations (see Figures
17–S22, Supplementary Material). Maximum-likelihood parame-
ers are similar between cities for many, but not all, parameters (see
ection S3 and Figures S23–25, Supplementary Material). Given
hat stochastic effects (He et al., 2011) and demographic differ-
nces may  generate regional variation in observed epidemiology,
ome variation is not surprising and reinforces the value of fitting to
n aggregated data set in which demographic and stochastic vari-
bility is suppressed. Fitting a hierarchical model that constrains
he distribution of parameter estimates between locations may
mprove the consistency of parameter estimates for individual city
ts (Mathews et al., 2010), however as our fit to the composite
ata set already provides a (less computationally intensive) route
o extracting parameter estimates representative of the total data
et, and we do not explore this option further here.
onclusions
We  have introduced a novel family of immunologically moti-
ated models of influenza transmission to describe the patterns of
ortality, infection and re-infection as observed in the 1918–19
K influenza pandemic. Where others have previously examined
nly mortality data, our multi-dimensional analysis provides new
nsights into the likely role of pre-existing and temporary immu-
ity. Our results suggest that heterosubtypic and cross-protective
mmune responses are an important factor in understanding the
ulti-wave behaviour of influenza pandemics.
Previous analyses of 1918–19 case reporting data in the UK have
uggested that illness in one wave conferred some protection in
ubsequent waves (Barry et al., 2008; Mathews et al., 2010), andics 8 (2014) 18–27
yet illness in multiple waves in an individual was  noted in each of
the five cities under study. We  have shown that three of our eight
candidate biologically motivated dynamical models, each assum-
ing different roles for pre-pandemic and acquired immunity to the
novel virus, can capture most of the observed features of the symp-
tom reporting and mortality data in the subset of English cities for
which the necessary data is available. Estimates for R0 vary from
3.5 to 10 across our plausible model candidates, but are more mod-
erate ∼5–6 when hosts with pre-pandemic influenza experience
are assumed to be fully infectious (i.e. models A2 and D2). Assum-
ing only seasonal changes in the basic reproduction number R0, we
infer seasonal forcing to be strong (amplitude bSF) with transmis-
sion peaking during winter (SF) for all plausible candidate models.
However seasonal forcing alone cannot halt “out of season” activity
following the third/winter wave without imposing additional con-
straints on the number of infections per host (through the boosting
factor Tw). In all models, loss of infection-acquired immunity (on
a time-scale Tw) is key to explaining multiple waves of infection in
the absence of strong heterogeneous or complex time-dependent
mixing effects. Together with low values for the proportion of infec-
tions that are symptomatic (˛i) our plausible model candidates
can approximately reproduce the fraction of hosts experiencing
symptomatic infections in multiple waves reported in the survey
symptom reporting data.
A model similar to that used to model the double peaked epi-
demic observed in RAF camps (Mathews et al., 2007) and attack
rates in English cities and schools (Mathews et al., 2010) is our
preferred candidate model (D2) based on its Akaike information
criterion when fitting to the composite data set. In this model we
find that a variable rate of loss of prior immunity that allows for
delayed and rapid loss of population-level prior immunity (from
state Q), rather than constant rate of loss used in our previous mod-
els, is required to recover epidemiologically plausible estimates for
the extent of pre-pandemic sterilising immunity when fitting to the
composite data set. While this candidate model can also fit the data
set for each individual location comprising the composite data set,
an exponential rate of loss of prior immunity with similar timing
is preferred for all individual locations, indicating that our mod-
elling has limited power to discriminate between mechanisms for
the loss of the prior immunity. Nevertheless, across all individual
data sets and our composite sets, a single change in viral phenotype
triggering loss of prior protection during the first wave, combined
with the low probability of reporting symptoms and heterologous
cross-protection following initial infection with a pandemic variant
that lasts ∼3 months, can explain the pattern of reported morbidity
and mortality in 1918–19.
Loss of pre-pandemic protection is not required to fit the triple
peaked epidemic data, as is evident in the fits of models A2 and
B2. However, without replenishment of the susceptible pool from
a previously immune pool (Q), rapid loss of acquired protection
(Tw) during the first wave is required to fuel the repeated waves
of infection (models A2, B2). Such a pattern of susceptibility could
indicate the circulation of up to 3 phenotypically distinct influenza
viruses over the course of the three waves. Alternatively, the very
rapid loss of immunity following initial infection could signal that
our simple model for infection-acquired immunity is inappropri-
ate for capturing the development and maintenance of adaptive
immunity over the pandemic period.
Assessing the relative plausibility of our model inferences
regarding adaptive immunity to pandemic IAV in plausible can-
didates is difficult, particularly given the lack of data on the
characteristics of the circulating viruses. Neutralising antibody
titres following confirmed infection with pH1N12009 were deemed
protective in only around 90 per cent of hosts (Hung et al., 2010),
suggesting a deficient immune response may  enable reinfection
with the same virus in some people. Symptomatic reinfection with
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H1N12009 was noted amongst a handful of cases (Perez et al.,
010; Trakulsrichai et al., 2012), over a range of time-periods
rom 2 weeks to 5 months. Modelling studies (Mathews et al.,
007; Camacho et al., 2011) and animal challenge studies (Seo
nd Webster, 2001) also suggest that delays in the development of
daptive immunity may  admit a window of opportunity for symp-
omatic reinfection following recovery. The mechanisms governing
he possibility of symptomatic reinfection of hosts in pandemic sce-
arios are complex (see Trakulsrichai et al., 2012) and to probe
hese more deeply would likely require further data on repeated
hallenge in human subjects.
omparison to previous work
Maximum likelihood estimates for R0 vary across plausible
odel candidates but are consistent with those inferred using sim-
lar models for immunity in our previous work (Mathews et al.,
007, 2010). Noting that as we fit to both mortality and symptom
eporting data rather than mortality data alone, and are therefore
ble to consider the impact of asymptomatic infection, all of our
stimates for R0 are significantly higher than those inferred by He
t al. (2011, 2013). Without the constraint of matching re-infection
ata in their analyses, He et al. were able to model dynamics with a
edian R0 = 2.36 and variations in transmissibility that are purely
riven by changes in population mixing rates and climatic effects.
odels for pH1N11918 transmission which assume the circula-
ion of multiple phenotypes with different values of R0 (Rios-Doria
nd Chowell, 2009), similar to our model A1*, would likely fit the
ata utilised here by allowing for wave-dependent transmissibility.
ariation in estimates of transmissibility depending on underlying
odel assumptions reinforce the importance of understanding the
limatic, sociological and virological determinants of transmission
n order to estimate the true fitness of pandemic viruses and the
auses of multi-wave epidemic behaviour.
We infer a very strong role for seasonal forcing in which trans-
ission in the winter is enhanced by 50–100 per cent. Such an
ffect is unlikely purely due to climatic factors (Shaman et al., 2009).
ecreased transmission during the summer months may  also be
ue to changes in mixing triggered by school holidays (Eames et al.,
012). Indeed He et al. report a significant forcing effect due to
chool term times of around 30 per cent (He et al., 2013).
Our preferred model, with fixed intrinsic viral transmissibility
ut heterogeneity in prior protection and the longevity of acquired
rotection, is consistent with independent analyses of this pan-
emic. Fits to our preferred model D2 suggest prior immunity in
nfluenza-experienced hosts protects this cohort at the beginning
f the first wave, and thus is qualitatively consistent with indepen-
ent analyses indicating negative correlations between population
ge and herald wave severity (Pearce et al., 2011). Regardless of the
echanisms driving changes in host immunity, our inference of sig-
ificant loss of both recently acquired and prior protection before
he end of the first wave is congruent with the widely discussed
ypothesis that the summer wave of the 1918 pandemic in Europe
as caused by a highly transmissible virus with relatively moder-
te pathogenesis that partially immunised the population against
 more pathogenic virus that was responsible for the autumn and
inter waves (Barry et al., 2008; Mathews et al., 2010; Olson et al.,
005), even though this was not an a priori assumption. Estimates of
igher symptom reporting and death rates for the second and third
aves are also consistent with such a hypothesis. Because exposure
uring the first wave was unlikely to result in clinical presentation
˛1 ≈ 0.1), this explanation (model D2) is not at odds with the lack
f direct epidemiological evidence for a significant loss of immu-
ity during the first wave(s) of the pandemic and indeed may  be
onsidered as a prompt for further investigation.ics 8 (2014) 18–27 25
Study limitations
Our model attributes heterogeneities in population suscepti-
bility to immunological rather than sociological, demographic or
(non-seasonal) environmental effects, and thus may  overestimate
the role of population immunity in moderating epidemic dynam-
ics. A population influx, for example due to the return of troops
following the end of First World War  combat, could also have pro-
vided “the fuel” for a severe second wave. Virus circulation had
already reached pandemic proportions prior to the autumn and
outbreaks in military camps were noted over the summer (see
Smallman-Raynor et al., 2002, and references therein). It there-
fore seems unlikely that troop movement significantly increased
the proportion of the population who were susceptible, although
mixing patterns and/or intensity may  have been altered. The sea-
sonal modulation of transmission included in our model limits
transmission during the summer months and thus may  mimic
the influence of reduced mixing during summer holidays. Sup-
pressed mixing during winter due to school holidays may  also be a
driver of multi-wave influenza pandemic transmission (Kubiak and
McLean, 2012). More complex temporal changes in transmissibil-
ity due to temperature and humidity are possibly also relevant for
understanding pandemic dynamics (Shaman et al., 2011). Reactive
social distancing may also have been important in this setting (He
et al., 2013).
It is also possible that our model does not have the appro-
priate structure to capture the dynamics of within host adaptive
immunity. Temporary partial immunity following recovery may
better describe the immune response to new viruses (Ferguson
et al., 2003). Allowing for a delay in the development of adap-
tive immunity may  be relevant in some contexts (Camacho
et al., 2011) and suboptimal immune responses due to original-
antigenic-sin like phenomena (Monsalvo et al., 2011) may  be
required to capture changing host immunity (even to the same
virus) over short time-scales. Mechanisms other than escape
of prior immunity such as immune-complex mediated disease
(Monsalvo et al., 2011), cytokine storm effects (de Jong et al., 2006)
and/or an evolution in virulence (Taubenberger and Kash, 2011)
may  also be responsible for increased disease severity in later
waves.
Age-dependent attack rates and mortality were observed
in sub-populations in 1918–19 (Shanks and Brundage, 2012).
Changes in the age-distribution of cases with time was also
noted in the 2009 pandemic (Pebody et al., 2010). Although
age was likely an important determinant of susceptibility,
mixing characteristics, propensity to report symptoms and like-
lihood of death, we do not have the age-dependent mortality
or morbidity data to constrain an age-dependent transmission
model.
The case reporting data we  have used is essential for constrain-
ing case fatality rates and the time-scale for loss of immunity,
however it is difficult to assign uncertainty to the available esti-
mates of the symptomatic attack rates given that they are based on
patient reporting data that were often collected by untrained staff
(Ministry of Health, 1920, p. 453) over an extended period following
the epidemic. There are additional concerns about the consistency
of the data collected in Manchester (Ministry of Health, 1920, p.
488). Circulation of other respiratory viruses such as Influenza B
and RSV may  also spuriously increase the reported proportion of
hosts experiencing repeated symptomatic infections. We  have only
briefly considered the significance of differences in mortality and
symptom reporting rates between cities studied. In future work
we will consider whether demographic differences in prior immu-
nity and climatic variation between the cities under study can
explain regional variations in the pattern of mortality and mor-
bidity.
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mplications
The data available to constrain epidemiological models for the
918–19 pandemic are limited, and as a result some parameters
n our candidate models (particularly model B2) are difficult to
dentify. Many data sources typically available for contemporary
andemics would improve parameter identifiability and enable
icher tests of models for heterologous immunity in transmission
ynamics. Longitudinal serological data would provide stronger
onstraints on pre-pandemic immunity and the proportion of
ymptomatic infections (Hoschler et al., 2012). Temporal phylo-
enetic characterisation of circulating viruses would enable well
otivated constraints on the timing of emergence of new variants
Yang et al., 2011) and surveys of mixing patterns (Eames et al.,
012) would enable the influence of school term times or reactive
ocial distancing to be incorporated as additional seasonal factors
n transmission (sensu He et al., 2013).
Our modelling indicates that viral escape of prior immunity
s consistent with pandemic influenza dynamics in 1918–19, and
ay  explain the observations of more severe disease in the sec-
nd wave of infection. While we cannot infer the genesis of prior
mmunity in our model, widespread prior immunity due to recog-
ition of T cell epitopes would be broadly consistent with evidence
hat many adults exhibited CD8+ T cell responses to pH1N12009
Groot et al., 2009; Scheible et al., 2011). Antibodies to conserved
egions of the haemaglutinin stalk may  also mediate partial het-
rosubtypic immunity relevant for a pandemic virus (Ellebedy
nd Ahmed, 2012). Despite significant evidence that heterologous
mmune response may  dampen the impact of a pandemic, a pan-
emic virus with novel antigenic type that has not circulated in
umans in the last century like H7N9 (Liu et al., 2013) would likely
ave devastating impact if it possessed transmissibility similar to
hat of pH1N11918.
Immunological determinants of prior immunity to novel or
merging pandemic viruses beyond the existence of protective
ntibody are still incompletely understood, but may prove crucial
or predicting and controlling the severity of pandemic influenza.
iral surveillance data which includes characterisation of T-cell epi-
opes, antigenic glycosylation and haemaglutinin stalk architecture
ould help constrain models for the influence of heterosubtypic
mmunity on influenza epidemiology. Models that can capture
he population-level consequence of changes in heterologous pro-
ection would be better placed to anticipate pandemic influenza
everity and consider the appropriate use of novel vaccines which
im to induce heterologous cross protection.
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